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Many aspects of the Chinese-U.S. relationship are mutually beneficial: some $400 billion in trade, bilateral military
 exchanges, and Beijing's increasingly constructive diplomatic role. There are other grounds for concern. Each side's
 militaries view the other as a potential adversary and increasingly make plans and structure their forces with that in
 mind.
On the conventional side, there are many important areas to consider, but the potential for nuclear rivalry raises
 monumental risks. This article assesses the dangers in the bilateral nuclear relationship, the potential for traditional
 arms control to address these challenges, the broadening of the "strategic" military sphere, and the issue of proliferation
 beyond the bilateral relationship.
Strategic relations are not at the center of Chinese-U.S. relations today. They do not deserve to be tomorrow. They are,
 however, rising appropriately in importance and must be managed proactively.
The Core Bilateral Strategic Relationship
China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing
 decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of
 development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is
 also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain
 frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its
 second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range
 of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased
 penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will
 undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been
 moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains
 mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These
 developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the
 strategic balance.[2]
The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation
 of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under
 the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its
 operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic
 missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the
 Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack
 submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that
 they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in
 the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign.
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What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of
 the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision
 guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems
 have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional
 missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike
 capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in
 the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such
 reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened
 threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts
 of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy.
Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN
 deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated,
 although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China
 appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent
 with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability
 in an intense crisis.
Prospects for Improvement?
There is no simple solution for this set of problems. The differences in national interests held by Beijing and
 Washington are not likely to be materially affected by Barack Obama's inauguration as president. That said, the
 unilateralist and anti-institutional approach to arms control that characterized the Bush administration is likely to wane.
 The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons:
 doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the
 Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remains much larger than China's. Yet, it is wrong to expect
 such views to hold in perpetuity. Beijing's emphasis on ambiguity about its arsenal, which is incompatible with serious
 negotiations over arms control, is not a cultural predisposition toward "strategic deception" any more than was the
 Soviet Union's early Cold War emphasis on secrecy. Instead, these are rational strategies when nuclear arsenals are
 small. Intrusive verification eventually became conceivable even to hard-line Soviet leaders. Certainly, economic
 exhaustion contributed to that change, but so too did fundamental changes in Soviet threat perceptions.[4] Although the
 former seems unlikely in China in the near term, the latter is something that might be fomented.
The further development of those U.S.-Russian arms control discussions will have critical implications for China. If
 follow-on agreements to START and SORT include further quantitative reductions, as is likely, they will again move
 the U.S. arsenal toward an important rhetorical threshold that China has used to justify its own stance on bilateral arms
 control. This poses risks and opportunities. The opportunity to bring the other nuclear powers to the table, even
 informally, as the Russian-U.S. discussions progress would be a useful vehicle to elicit China's interest in serious
 moves in this area. The risk of enticing China to engage in an arsenal buildup to U.S. levels is not one that should be
 overstated. At the geostrategic level as well as in operational doctrine as it is understood, China's approach to nuclear
 strategy has emphasized elements that would be inconsistent with a large buildup: counter-value rather than counter-
force or war-fighting doctrines, a historical tolerance of much lower arsenal sizes given a perception of the limited
 utility of nuclear forces, and, explicitly, avoidance of a strategic arms race. The United States can actively reduce these
 risks further.
Deepening engagement on nuclear and nuclear-related strategic issues would be constructive in this regard. Bilateral
 confidence measures between China and the United States could be discussed, particularly in the area of declaratory
 policy. The Chinese have often asked why the United States is unwilling to offer a no-first-use pledge. A blanket no-
first-use pledge might undermine U.S. credibility in other regions. Yet, a pledge narrowly confined to the Chinese-U.S.
 arena would seem to have fewer costs. What benefits would the United States garner from such a pledge from Beijing?
 Similarly, would Beijing view positively a definitive statement that the United States accepts the existence of a Chinese
 secure second-strike capability? For what might the United States hope in return? These questions remain unanswered.
Other steps could move beyond diplomacy alone. Detailed discussions with China of U.S. warhead modernization plans
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 that take Chinese concerns seriously could be constructive. Similarly, a reinvigorated U.S. effort to ratify the
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would hint at a broader return to the commitment toward multilateral arms
 control that characterized U.S. foreign policy under both parties throughout the Cold War. Such reinvigoration of the
 broader regime is critical to making progress on narrowly bilateral issues as that regime provides a global context in
 which Beijing views the bilateral relationship. Finally, are there aspects of the U.S. modernization program, for
 instance, highly accurate guidance systems on Trident II warheads, that Washington and Omaha might be willing to
 forgo in exchange for tacit restraint in other areas from Beijing? Precisely these sorts of trades were at the heart of
 important arms control agreements between the Soviets and the United States in the Cold War. Although such steps are
 premature today, understanding the possible parameters of such exchanges is useful for laying the groundwork for
 future discussions.
Certainly, some of the onus for stagnation of dialogue on such issue rests with China. Direct U.S. interaction with
 Chinese nuclear strategists is extremely rare, and the Bush administration is to be commended for prioritizing an
 official dialogue on this topic with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Second Artillery (its nuclear force) in
 particular.[5] Still, even scheduling meetings has been fraught with difficulties. Most recently, Beijing used a Taiwan
 arms sales package as a pretext to derail official discussion of these topics. The Obama administration should advocate
 rapid resumption of these important confidence-building measures. At the same time, it is important for the United
 States to discuss Chinese concerns about U.S. plans openly and honestly. The increasing coupling of strategic
 modernization and development suggests this issue needs added attention from both sides.[6]
Broadened Meaning of "Strategic"
Space and missile defense are increasingly intertwined with traditional nuclear issues. U.S. missile defense certainly
 complicates the calculus of potential adversaries, but it also greatly complicates traditional approaches to reducing
 dangers of strategic weapons. International relations theory has trouble putting nuclear weapons and missile defense
 systems into an "offensive-defensive" dichotomy because most theorizing about nuclear weapons took place in the era
 of mutually assured destruction when the utility of nuclear weapons for anything other than retaliation made little sense.
 The space realm is clear in that area. Anti-satellite weapons are clearly offense dominant today: first-strike attacks
 against satellites confer great advantages, and defenses are costly and not currently deployed. This emphasizes the
 dangers of spirals and security dilemmas. Other issues are less straightforward. The dual-use potential for launch
 capabilities complicates verification of any potential arms control agreement. More broadly, communications and data
 collection satellites are directly connected to economic markets in ways most military technologies are not.
Beyond applying these general concerns to its own situation, Beijing sees a fairly integrated package that seems
 designed to undermine the security of its second-strike capability. Improved accuracy and capacity for hitting silos call
 into question China's older missiles. Advanced intelligence assets would be useful for tracking China's nascent mobile
 missile force. Accurate conventional weapons, global strike or otherwise, could reduce the scale of damage imposed on
 Chinese society writ large in some cases. Even a moderate-scale missile defense system-the Pentagon is planning on 50
 interceptors by 2012-provides important capabilities against any surviving Chinese missiles.
The incoming Obama administration can do much to improve on existing policy. The Russians have received extensive
 briefings on U.S. missile defense systems and were offered the right to observe control rooms in eastern European
 missile defense facilities. What steps along that range might be appropriate for China? In the area of space policy,
 numerous small steps can be taken in terms of codes of conduct, launch notifications, noninterference pledges, and
 other issues.[7] Again, even discussing these issues has been quite simply off the table under the Bush administration.
 Chinese proposals on "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" require much further development before they can
 be adequately evaluated. Several issues are critical from the U.S. perspective: the status of various missile defense
 technologies under that proposal, dual-use technologies, and the nature of verification in general. Still, more active U.S.
 diplomacy on this issue, whether at the Conference on Disarmament or in other fora, would be beneficial. An
 administration less wedded to complete freedom of action on missile defense technologies and scale should be willing
 at least to begin these discussions.
Nonproliferation: Global Regimes and Specific Cases
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A global approach to nonproliferation will fail without China's active support. Bush administration policies have eroded
 the current system, already under stress due to globalization and the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-Indian deal on
 nuclear energy was highly salient for China because of its rivalry with India and friendship with Pakistan. In the North
 Korean case, inspections may well move forward on a bilateral basis rather than through existing global fora.
The United States can take steps to begin to repair this damage, regaining the initiative on the global nonproliferation
 regime. Quick ratification of the CTBT will send a positive signal. Reinvigorated diplomacy on a treaty cutting off the
 production of fissile material for weapons might do so as well. On that issue, however, China's objections need to be
 taken seriously. China's stockpile of fissile material is a miniscule fraction of that of the United States. Freezing that
 ratio in place in perpetuity is something China would only concede in response to other inducements. These should be
 discussed frankly.
Beyond these small-scale steps and more fundamentally, a new nonproliferation architecture is needed. China must be
 integrally involved in its design. In the wake of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal and with failures to stop proliferation in
 North Korea, it is unclear if the current hodgepodge of overlapping institutions (nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], etc.) will continue to form the basis of the
 global approach to containing proliferation. As new global approaches are developed, it should be recognized that
 China's participation in the World Trade Organization and in the recent G-20 meetings on the financial crisis has
 generally been responsible, if not entirely to U.S. liking. In the current global context, the United States cannot dictate
 the design of that architecture; Beijing, as well as others, must play a constitutive role.
It should be noted that Beijing's behavior in several specific cases has improved in this regard. Secretary of State
 Condoleezza Rice has hailed Chinese leadership of the six-party talks. Chinese policy on Iran hardened notably in
 2006, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1696. In both cases, U.S. preferences would have been for still-
firmer action, but the progress in Chinese policy is clearly discernable. On the other hand, China's recent apparent
 regression in deciding to sell additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan seemed to flout common sense and its previous
 commitments to the NSG. Again, however, the U.S. role in undermining the framework within which the NSG exists
 by pursuing the India deal is notable.
Creating the same degree of engagement and, indeed, internalization of goals that China has on North Korea in the other
 two cases-Iran and Pakistan-will be elusive. Iran serves important energy security needs for Beijing,[8] and Pakistan's
 role in traditional Chinese security concerns on its flank is substantial. Still, a U.S. nonproliferation policy that
 discriminates based on regime type rather than nonproliferation behavior is unlikely to resonate in authoritarian China.
 A creation of international institutions that can judge proliferation behavior impartially would be more successful.
 Chinese analysts voice increasing concern that proliferation is a problem for China rather than merely a Western
 concern.
Tailored...Diplomacy
It is critical that policymakers recognize the rapidly changing nature of the way foreign policy is practiced in China
 today. Although deep-seated strategic cultural norms are of limited utility in understanding China's policy today, the
 interplay between civilian and military leaders and the proliferation of inputs available to policymakers is. On arms
 control issues, the tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA strain the policy formulation process.
 Understanding Chinese space policy requires an immersion in the economic actors that shape PLA policy. Proliferation
 issues bring a different set of economic actors into the process. Even asking whether there is civilian control in any of
 these policy areas grossly oversimplifies. China is in the midst of substantial political change, a pluralization of actors,
 and a new set of political responses to a range of domestic challenges. This process complicates any interaction with
 China on security issues as well.
These domestic changes complicate the dynamism in the strategic arena itself. The interaction of the U.S. shift in
 approach toward strategic weapons coupled with modernization of China's arsenal has much potential to destabilize the
 relationship. Further tightening of the interlocking moves by each side has the potential to lead to an arms race, at least
 in qualitative terms. This would move the strategic issue to the foreground of the relationship. Given that there are pre-
existing contentious issues to be dampened and more positive aspects to the relationship to be managed, this outcome
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 would be inflammatory. Strategic nuclear competition between the two nations would be extraordinarily costly. Taking
 prudent steps to keep this issue out of the center of the relationship today is valuable. The policies suggested above
 would be important first steps in dampening dangerous dynamics in Chinese-U.S. strategic relations.
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